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Due to demographic change and medical progress demand for health care 
rises substantially faster than other aspects of economic activity and, corres-
pondingly, health care expenditures. Thus, economic efficiency in health 
care delivery is an issue of vital concern for all industrialized economies. 
Specifically, the financial performance of acute care hospitals which account 
for roughly a quarter of total health care expenditures (OECD 2007) is an 
important element of the overall financial viability of health systems. From 
the perspective of economic policy, the best approach to dealing with ineffi-
ciencies is not obvious. If financial performance of hospitals is persistent 
over time, short-term measures to reduce costs in existing hospitals may not 
be very successful. Rather, it might be advisable to close down loss-making 
hospitals. However, if such hospitals tend to improve their financial perfor-
mance substantially over time, restructuring to increase their efficiency or 
selling them to experienced private restructurers can be reasonable alterna-
tives.  
To substantiate this debate, this paper assesses the dynamics of financial 
performance of German hospitals, based on their probability of default 
(PD), and investigates differences in the PD between ownership types. In 
the past, hospitals in Germany had only few incentives to increase their 
efficiency and achieve financial soundness: Until the 1990ies hospitals oper-
ated under a regime of full cost reimbursement. Together with community 
subsidies, this system insured them against any risk of default. Even today 
some communities regularly finance the annual deficits of their publicly 
owned community hospitals. However, recent reforms such as the introduc-
tion of a prospective payment system in 2004 have emphasized hospitals’ 
responsibilities for their economic performance. Most importantly, econom-
ic defaults of hospitals have become a realistic contingency. Consequently, 
measures to reduce costs and increase efficiency, and even the privatization 
of publicly owned hospitals, are on the political agenda.  
Already between 1991 and 2006 the market share of public hospitals (meas-
ured in terms of hospital beds) fell from 61.4% to 51.1% while that of for-
profit hospitals increased from 4.0% to 13.6% (Destatis 2006). In this 
process, the share of private nonprofit hospitals remained relatively stable, 
increasing from 34.6% to 35.3%.
1 Since market entry barriers erected by 
regulatory requirements and high start-up costs are substantial, private for-
                                                           
1 A similar development can be observed within the US hospital market (Hansmann et al. 
2003).  Ownership and Financial Performance in the German Hospital Sector  5 
profits expanded their market share mainly via privatizations of public hos-
pitals. Augurzky et al. (2008) report that privatization accounts for 73% of 
the gain in beds of for-profits between 1996 and 2005. And in order to avoid 
privatization more and more public owners change the legal status of their 
hospitals from being part of the community’s balance sheets to independent 
limited liability corporations owned by the community. In 2003 30% out of 
796 publicly owned hospitals were run as an independent limited liability 
corporation, in 2006 this was already the case for 51% (Destatis 2008).
2 
Many observers argue that private ownership tends to produce superior 
financial outcomes, thus advocating an increased emphasis, within the sys-
tem of health care delivery, on private rather than public hospitals. We test 
this hypothesis in this paper. The key arguments are derived from theories 
of property rights, asymmetric information (Furubotn and Petrovich 1972, 
Danzon 1982, Easley, O’Hara 1983, Hansmann 1987, 1980) or bureaucracy 
theory (Eisinger 1993). However, due to a variety of data and methods used 
and the difficulty to test the theories directly, empirical results are mixed. In 
the setting of a meta-analysis Shen et al. (2005) find only a modest differ-
ence in profitability in favor of for-profit hospitals. Analyses that have 
sought to explain credit ratings find that private nonprofit, hospitals chains 
(Sloan et al. 1987), hospitals with a high market share, those located near 
urban markets and with high occupancy rates (McCue et al. 1990, 1996) 
receive good ratings, on average. Most studies have analyzed the financial 
performance of hospitals within the U.S. (e.g. McCue et al. 1990, 1996). To 
our knowledge, no empirical evidence exists for Europe, however. 
In a market that is changing its efficiency so rapidly, taking a snapshot pers-
pective does not suffice. Rather, our empirical contrasts between public, 
profit and nonprofit hospitals should also address the persistence in finan-
cial performance over time. In particular, many public hospitals in Germany 
are subsidized by their public owners, allowing them to exist with annual 
deficits for a protracted period. Furthermore, local politicians might be 
against the serious restructuring of a hospital because they may fear job 
losses in their community. Probably for these reasons public hospitals often 
retain capacity above cost-efficient capacity limits and adjust capacity more 
slowly in markets with changing demand (Steinwald and Neuhauser 1970; 
Hansmann 1987, Hansmann et al. 2003). Therefore, path dependence may 
be stronger for public hospitals, and yet after a while they might be able to 
achieve the same level of efficiency as privatized hospitals. The only study 
addressing financial performance of hospitals over time is Wilcox-Gök 
(2002) who finds for Florida between 1984 and 1987 that nonprofits neither 
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perform better nor worse than for-profits. However, in her study no differ-
ence between public and private nonprofits is made. 
In order to assess both long-term economic viability and the dynamics of 
financial performance of German hospitals, we first use a static model to 
explain the level of the PD and then consider a dynamic model specification 
to estimate its path dependence. For this purpose, we estimate an autore-
gressive distributed lag model via generalized methods of moments (GMM) 
and bias-corrected Least Squares Dummy Variables (LSDVC) estimators. 
We thereby draw on a unique data base, the hospital-level data underlying 
the annual hospital rating reports (Krankenhaus-Rating Reports) produced 
by a research consortium led by the Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für 
Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI). Most importantly this data contains informa-
tion on hospitals’ financial performance and on their ownership status. 
In short, we find that in terms of their financial performance, hospitals are 
quite heterogeneous. Confirming the impression held by many participants 
in the current debate, private ownership is more likely to be associated with 
sound levels in financial performance than public ownership. Moreover, it 
seems that path dependence can be substantial, but is in general not owner-
ship-specific. While those hospitals which already displayed a low probabili-
ty of default in the past frequently even improve financial soundness over 
time, some hospitals with a particularly bad financial performance tend to 
remain in that state over time. This result suggests that closing down the 
worst low-performers is more promising as a strategy for economic policy 
than the decision to restructure all low-performers. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the data and a descrip-
tive analysis with a focus on the dynamics of the PD. Section 3 introduces 
the econometric model and estimation methods to explain the PD. Results 
are presented in section 4. The paper concludes with a summary and a dis-
cussion of the results in section 5. Ownership and Financial Performance in the German Hospital Sector  7 
2.  Data and descriptive results 
2.1 Data 
Probability of default 
Our main database is an unbalanced panel of 962 balance sheets from 331 
hospitals covering the years 2001 to 2005.
3 Table 1 compares the sample with 
the population of acute care hospitals in Germany excluding purely psychia-
tric hospitals. Our sample slightly overrepresents hospitals of public and 
private nonprofit and underrepresents hospitals of for-profit ownership. On 
average the sample includes bigger hospitals. Some 18 percent of hospitals 
in the sample cover 24.4 percent of total bed capacity. This is due to the fact 
that balance sheets in our sample can comprise more than one hospital. This 
especially applies to for-profits whose size (in terms of beds) is more than 
double the average size in the universe of all hospitals.
4 In our sample, all 
public hospitals operate under the legal status of private law. This assures 
that they use the same accounting principles as private hospitals, facilitating 
sensible comparisons across ownership types. By contrast, balance sheet 
data of hospitals operating under public law is hardly available, because 
these hospitals are not obliged by law to publish their balance sheet data. 
Our measure of financial performance is the probability with which an en-
terprise is predicted to default within one year (probability of default, PD). 
The PD is a comprehensive indicator of financial soundness and often pre-
ferred by institutional creditors to simple alternative measures such as prof-
its or costs. And indeed, for the purpose of investments, hospitals increas-
ingly rely on external capital such as bank loans. Against the background of 
the new financial regulation “Basle II” which raises credit costs for borrow-
ers displaying a high risk of default, we expect higher risk premiums for 
financially instable hospitals. As our focus lies on financial performance, we 
do not take into account explicit or implicit guarantees, e.g. those given by 
public owners such as municipalities: From the perspective of a creditor 
these guarantees would reduce the risk of default, but our assessment asks 
how financially sound is a hospital without the luxury of tapping public 
funds. The PD is not only comparable across hospitals, it also indicates the 
risk to the tax payer who usually has to pay for guarantees.  
                                                           
3 The data are extracted from the Dafne database. Dafne is a product of the largest German 
credit rating agency (Creditreform), distributed by the leading company in electronic publish-
ing of business information (Bureau van Dijk). It is updated monthly. In 2007 it contained 
accounting data for over 105,000 German firms. Accounting data is collected centrally at Cre-
ditreform headquarters and the quality of the data should be high. 




Table 1  
Acute care hospitals in Germany
1 in 2005 – sample and population 
Building a model to predict the PD is difficult in any small sample compris-
ing only few defaults. In our case its direct estimation is impossible because 
there have been only very few actual hospital defaults in the past. For politi-
cal reasons, those hospitals at high risk of default typically obtained public 
help and were artificially kept alive. But even if that were not the case, sam-
ple size would preclude a precise estimation: if we assumed an average de-
fault rate of 1.5% per year, we would only find on average 5 defaults per 
year in our sample. Given this restriction, instead of using statistical me-
thods to construct a hospital rating from our balance sheet data, we rely on 
an existing quantitative rating tool. Its details are explained in the Appen-
dix. 
Explanatory variables 
To prepare our analysis, we merge each hospital’s PD with several individu-
al and regional hospital characteristics based on different data sources. For 
our purposes, the most important characteristic is the ownership type, where 
we distinguish public (hospitals owned by public authorities), private non-
profit (secular and religious) and private for-profit hospitals. Further va-
riables included are a measure of market power, hospital size in terms of the 
number of beds and its square and a hospital’s relative cost level. To ac-
count for observable heterogeneity on regional level of the German Federal 
States we control for the regional level of public subsidies, ownership type-
specific hospital capacity utilization on the level of the German Federal 
States, a dummy for the location of a hospital in East versus West Germany
5 
and the yearly per capita level of income. Detailed definitions and descrip-
                                                           
5 Due to the specific situation in East Germany after re-unification, namely the lack of mod-
ern medical care in the early 1990ies, the level of public support differs remarkably between 
East and West in favor of East Germany. 
 Ownership    #  beds 
Ownership form  Sample  Population  Sample  Population 
Public  135 (41.0%)
2  647 (35.1%)  446 (295)  386 (320) 
Private-nonprofit  134 (39.8%)  712 (38.6%)  335 (178)  247 (163) 
For-profit  62 (19.3%)  487 (26.4%)  271 (241)  121 (175) 
All  331 (100%)  1846 (100%) 369 (253)  263 (281) 
 Hospitals  Beds 
Sample to population share   18.0% 24.4% 
Notes: 
1 Excluding purely psychiatric hospitals; 
2 Shares of hospitals in parentheses. Ownership and Financial Performance in the German Hospital Sector  9 
tive statistics of all variables are available in the Appendix in Table A1.
6 
Other potentially informative variables concerning average patient charac-
teristics, which may impact upon the financial performance of hospitals, are 
not available in this study. However, former studies have not confirmed 
such characteristics to be important for the financial performance of hospit-
als (McCue et al. 1990, 1996). 
2.2 Descriptive results 
By construction the PD varies continuously between zero and one. Over all 
waves and hospitals the average (predicted) PD amounts to 1.29% (Table 
2). For comparison: some 142 of 10,000 firms in the German health sector 
(NACE code 80) actually filed for bankruptcy in 2004 (Destatis 2006). On 
average, public hospitals exhibit an average PD of 1.54%, private nonprofits 
0.95% and for-profits 1.39%. Around 16% of the hospitals face a PD above 
2.6% (not in the table). The PD is changing over the years, with steady im-
provements observed among for-profit hospitals. Private nonprofit and, in 
an even more pronounced fashion, public hospitals experienced a decline of 
their financial performance up to 2003, and a recovery thereafter. This pat-
terns is largely independent by new hospitals entering the sample as well as 
drop-outs from the sample. As shown in Table 2, the pattern hold in the 
balanced sample  which based on the three most recent PDs. Thus, it seems 
that the downward trend displayed by private for-profit hospitals merely 
disguised the general economic problem arising in 2003. 
One part of changes in the average PD over time may be due to hospital 
drop-outs from and entries into the sample. If they are not random with 
respect to the PD, then the PD cannot be compared over time. We therefore 
check whether the probability of an entry or a drop-out is systematically 
associated with a hospital’s PD or its other characteristics. Table A2 in the 
Appendix presents the results of the corresponding multivariate probit 
models. We find no statistically significant relation association the PD and 
the probability of a drop-out. However, the results reveal a quantitatively 
modest, negative and statistically significant association between the PD and 
the probability of entering the sample in the year 2004. Overall, there is very 
little evidence of sample selection with respect to financial performance.  
                                                           
6 We have also information on the number of hospitals in a hospital chain, the hospital’s age, 
the population change between 1996 and 2005 and the share of people aged 60 or above, per 
income growth between 1996 and 2005 and the distinction between urban and non-urban re-
gions. However, in all estimations these variables were statistically insignificant. We have 
therefore dropped them from the regressions. 10    B. Augurzky, D. Engel, C. M. Schmidt und C. Schwierz
 
  
Table 2  
Mean probability of default by wave and ownership type – unbalanced and 
balanced samples 
  2001-2005  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Unbalanced sample 
All 1.29  1.33  1.36 1.48 1.21 1.11 
Public 1.54  1.36  1.73 1.83 1.40 1.37 
Private nonprofit  0.95  0.95 0.81 1.07 0.98 0.87 
For-profit   1.39  1.91 1.65 1.59 1.22 0.68 
Balanced sample
1  - Based on three most recent PDs 
All 1.29  1.08  1.67 1.35 1.15 1.25 
Public 1.71  1.09  2.69 1.73 1.49 1.67 
Private nonprofit  0.94  1.19 0.85 0.98 0.96 0.89 
For-profit   1.08  1.02 1.59 1.05 0.68 0.63 
Notes: 
1 Similar evidence is also available for balanced samples, spanning 2, 4 and 5 periods, 
respectively. 
A rough check of the possible importance of path dependence in the PD is 
the inspection of changes of the location of hospitals in the PD distribution. 
Table 3 reports transitions over time between three broad categories of 
financial performance. We categorize all hospitals with PDs up to 1.0 per-
cent as “green”, those in the range of 1.0 percent to 2.6 percent as “yellow” 
and those above 2.6 percent as “red”. “Green” hospitals are regarded as 
creditworthy and obtain loans at relatively low costs. For “yellow” hospitals, 
the raising of credit becomes more difficult and costly, but is usually still 
possible. ”Red” hospitals face great difficulties in borrowing.  
The table documents a high degree of persistence in the PD. In all cases 
hospitals are most likely to remain in the same category from one year to 
the next. Moreover, the likelihood of a transition to a category that is fur-
ther away is always lower than the likelihood of a transition to a closer cate-
gory.
7 Across ownership types, persistence as well as the rates of improve-
ments are similar, when considering the “green” and “yellow” categories. 
However, there seems to be a significant difference across ownership types 
in the “red” category. The probability for for-profits to remain in this cate-
gory is half the probability of public hospitals. Thus, improvements in finan-
cial performance for hospitals with a high PD seem more probable for pri-
vate than public hospitals. 
                                                           
7 This is also the case for two-year and three-year transitions. Results are available from the 
authors upon request. Ownership and Financial Performance in the German Hospital Sector  11 
Table 3  
One-year transition matrices in the probability of default by ownership 
 
All For-profits 
Greent Yellowt Redt Obs. Greent Yellowt Redt Obs. 
Greent-1  88% 10%  2% 421 88%  9% 3% 78 
Yellow t-1  36% 45%  19%  111 36% 50%  14% 22 
Red t-1  5%  28%  67% 99  13% 50%  38% 16 
Obs.  416  118 97 631  79  26  11 116 
  Private nonprofits  Public 
  Greent Yellowt Redt Obs. Greent Yellowt Redt Obs. 
Green t-1  93%  5% 2% 170  83% 14% 3% 173 
Yellow t-1  31% 45%  24% 29  38% 43%  18% 60 
Redt-1  3% 31%  66%  29  4% 20%  76%  54 
Obs.  168 31  29  228  169 61  57  287 
Notes: Own calculations; “green” captures PDs ranging from 0.0 to 1.0 percent, “yellow” from 
1.0 to 2.6 percent and “red” those above 2.6 percent. 
3. Econometric  models  and estimation methods 
The main goal of our analysis is to explain the PD of hospital i at time t, pdit. 
The basic model is static. As the PD is bounded between 0 and 1, it is con-
venient to specify the model as a logistic function: 
, ,... 1     , ´ ) log( N i x pd it it i it = + + = ε β α                     (1) 
 
where the coefficient  i α is a hospital-specific component capturing unob-
served time-constant heterogeneity across hospitals,  it x  is  a set of observed 
variables associated with the hospitals’ PDs,  it ε  is a time- and individual-
specific error term. Taking logarithms eliminates the lower bound of the 
PD. The upper bound of the PD should not pose a problem in estimation, 
because the highest PD in the sample is 0.3 and there are very few hospitals 
reaching these high values of the PD. 
Equation (1) can be estimated using a “pooled” regression with correction 
of standard errors for clustering of hospitals and with random- or fixed-
effects panel regressions. The “pooled” regression ignores hospital-specific 
unobserved heterogeneity and, similarly to the random-effects panel regres-
sion focuses on variations in the levels of the PD, while the fixed-effect es-
timator sheds light on the contribution of changes of explanatory variables 12    B. Augurzky, D. Engel, C. M. Schmidt und C. Schwierz
 
  
on changes in the PD over time. That is, in the fixed-effects specification, 
the vector  it x  can only comprise time-varying entries. 
To capture any persistence in the PD we include the lagged value of the PD 
(pdi,t-1) as an explanatory variable in a dynamic model:  
() () , ,... 1     , ~ ´
~ ~ log log 1 , N i x pd pd it it i t i it = + + + = − ε β α λ                   (2) 
where 0≤λ≤1 measures the degree of persistence in the PD (Tamm et al. 
2007). If λ=1, the PD is non-stationary and the model follows a random 
walk. In this case only changes in the PDs can be explained through xit and 
not their levels. Transitory changes in xit then have permanent effects on the 
PD. In contrast, if λ=0 the model is static as in (1), and the PD is not path-
dependent. In this case, only hospital specific level-effects determine per-
manent differences in the PDs across hospitals. Temporary changes in the xit 
then have only short-term effects. In the general case, where λ lies between 
zero and one, transitory changes in xit have persistent effects on the PDs 
which are decreasing over time.  
In an additional modeling step, we include in equation (2) interaction terms 
between ownership types and the lagged PD to analyze ownership-specific 
adjustments in the PDs. Further, to allow for more heterogeneity in beha-
vior across ownership types we split the sample by ownership types and re-
estimate equation (2). Additionally, we test for differences in the persis-
tence of the PD due to different starting levels of the PD. The starting levels 
are defined by the categories “green”, “yellow” and “red” as presented 
above. Thus, for each subsample we rerun the regressions by introducing 
interaction terms between each category of the PD and the lagged PD. 
Based on the availability of up to five observations for each hospital, we are 
able to accommodate for the occurrence of unobserved individual hetero-
geneity and dynamics in the PD at the same time as in equation (2). Yet, by 
construction the lagged dependent variable is correlated with the current 
value of the composite error term  it i ε α ~ ~ + , and therefore OLS, random- and 
fixed-effects estimators yield inconsistent results (Baltagi 2001). Consistent 
estimates can be achieved by applying difference GMM, system GMM or 
bias-corrected Least Squares Dummy Variables (LSDVC) estimators. 
GMM estimators are introduced in more detail in Bond (2002), whereas the 
LSDVC is discussed in Bruno (2005).  
In difference GMM, the regression equation is differenced first and twice 
lagged dependent variables (pdi,t-2) are used as instruments for the first-order 
differenced lagged dependent variable (Anderson, Hsiao 1982). The effi-Ownership and Financial Performance in the German Hospital Sector  13 
ciency of this estimator increases with the use of higher-order lagged endo-
genous variables as instruments, e.g. pdit-3, and the use of additional variables 
with explanatory power. In the case of high persistence of the endogenous 
variable the first-differenced GMM may suffer from small sample bias and 
imprecision. In that case, system GMM as suggested by Arellano and Bover 
(1995) is a viable alternative estimation technique. System GMM estimates 
simultaneously level and first-difference equations to exploit additional 
moment conditions. The estimator needs to fulfil the assumption that the 
error term in the first period  it ε ~
 and the first-differenced exogenous vari-
ables  it x Δ be uncorrelated with the individual specific effect  i α ~  (Blundell 
and Bond 1998). 
In GMM the number of instruments varies with the extent to which the 
explanatory variables are exogenous, predetermined or endogenous with 
respect to the error term  it ε ~ . When over-identified, the validity of the in-
struments can be tested on the basis of Sargan and difference Sargan tests, 
which can help to choose the appropriate model specification. Bond (2002) 
proposes a Sargan Test to test the assumption of strict exogeneity and, thus, 
to test the validity of the whole set of instruments. The difference Sargan 
test allows evaluating the validity of additional instruments. It is obtained by 
comparison of the Sargan statistics of a restricted and unrestricted model, 
where the restricted version includes the additional instruments and mo-
ment conditions.
8  
In this paper we present results for system as opposed to the difference 
GMM estimator, as the Sargan tests gave support to it. Moreover, we use 
the more efficient two-step procedure, where the second-step estimation is 
based on weighted results from a consistent first-step estimator. As there is 
a potential problem of underestimating the standard errors obtained from 
GMM in small samples, the corrected variance estimator proposed by 
Windmeijer (2005) is applied in all GMM estimations. Estimation is based 
on the STATA routine xtabond2 (Roodman 2003). 
One potential problem with the GMM approach is that its properties hold 
asymptotically for a small number of periods, but a large number of individ-
uals. In contrast, newer LSDVC estimators are available for panels with a 
small number of cross-sectional units. Bruno (2005) presents a LSDVC es-
timator for dynamic unbalanced panels. Monte Carlo evidence suggests the 
superiority of the LSDVC estimator according to bias and root mean square 
                                                           
8 By convention we speak of (difference) Sargan test, but actually present results of Han-
sen’s J-statistic. Hansen’s J-statistic is preferable to the Sargan test when there is heteroscedas-
ticity. 14    B. Augurzky, D. Engel, C. M. Schmidt und C. Schwierz
 
  
error criteria as compared to GMM estimators, when the number of indi-
viduals is small. The estimator corrects for the inconsistency of LSDV esti-
mation in dynamic panels by using a consistent dynamic first-step estimator, 
i.e. either Anderson and Hsiao (1982), Arellano and Bond (1991) or Blun-
dell and Bond (1998). The estimator can implement three different approx-
imation formulae for the inconsistency of the LSDV estimators which vary 
in the extent of approximation. Furthermore, within a small sample it is 
problematic to evaluate the variability of the coefficients. Bruno (2005) uses 
bootstrap methods which provide approximations to the sampling distribu-
tions of the estimated coefficients to test for their statistical significance.  
We use the LSDVC estimator for two purposes. First, we compare, as a way 
of sensitivity analysis, whether the GMM results largely differ from LSDVC 
results, and thus if our results are sensitive to the estimator used. Second, we 
use the small sample property of LSDVC estimators to exploit the hetero-
geneity in behavior across hospitals, once we split the data into subsamples 
by ownership types. In all regressions we use the Blundell and Bond type of 
GMM estimation for bias-correction of the LSDV, 100 repetitions for the 
bootstrap variance-covariance matrix and bias approximation of order   
N
-1T
-2. Estimation is based on the STATA routine xtlsdvc (Bruno 2005). 
4.  Results 
4.1 Static model 
First, we present the results of the static model as in equation (1). The ran-
dom effects specification was rejected by an augmented version of the 
Hausman test (Davidson and MacKinnon 1993).
9 We therefore present the 
results of the fixed-effects model (Table 4). To compare our results to pre-
vious research we add “pooled” regression results to highlight potential 
differences in the current level of the PD between hospitals of different 
ownership type (column 1). These cannot be analyzed in the fixed-effect 
specification because we do not have information about conversions of hos-
pitals in ownership type in our sample. According to our estimates, private 
ownership is associated with a significantly lower PD than public ownership. 
                                                           
9 In the traditional Hausman test the estimated difference between the covariance matrices 
of the coefficients of the random and fixed-effects model may not be positive definite. This has 
an effect on the statistical reliance of the test. We thus employ an augmented specification of 
the test as  () () it i i it i it x x x pd ε α λ λ + + − + = 2 1 log .Under the null hypotheses 
2 1 λ λ = the model 
collapses to the random-effects estimator, whereas under the alternative we have a specifica-
tion which conditions the estimates of time-varying variables on within-individual means, which 
is equivalent to fixed-effects.  Ownership and Financial Performance in the German Hospital Sector  15 
Wilcox-Gök (2002) presents a qualitatively similar result for U.S. hospitals 
with average net revenue as the indicator of financial performance. Fur-
thermore, the results suggest a nonlinear association between hospital size 
and PD, where small hospitals display a relatively high PD. Finally, there is 
a positive association between market power and the PD: a higher combina-
tion goes along with higher PDs.  
Table 4  
The probability of default –static model 
  Pooled OLS Fixed-effects 
Coeff. SE
1 Coeff. SE 
Hospital characteristics   
Private for-profit -0.840* (0.469) --  
Private nonprofit -0.775** (0.318) --  
Beds -0.003** (0.001) -0.003 (0.008) 
Beds squared (*10
-3) 0.002** (0.001) 0.002 (0.006) 
Market concentration (HHI) 0.025*** (0.006) -0.389** (0.152) 
Relative cost level  -0.479 (1.095) -1.997 (1.556) 
Regional characteristics   
Regional capacity utilization -1.952 (4.778) -3.054 (6.791) 
Regional public subsidies  0.003*** (0.001) -0.002 (0.004) 
Regional income level  -0.001 (0.010) -0.125** (0.052) 
East Germany -1.060* (0.591) --  
Constant 0.522 (4.181) --  
Observations 962 962 
Number of hospitals 331 331 
R-squared 0.10 0.04
2 
F-Test (whole model) 6.87*** 2.27** 
F-test for joint significance of bed 
variables 
1.35 0.13 
Augmented Hausman test ( )
2 χ   - 26.35*** 
Notes: 
1 Huber-White robust standard errors, clustered at hospital level;
2 Within R-squared for 
fixed-effects estimation; ***Indicates significance at 1% level; **at 5% level; *at 10% level. 
Regarding regional indicators, we do not find a significant impact of re-
gional capacity utilization on the PD. High levels of regional public subsi-
dies correlate positively and significantly with the PD, though. This could be 
interpreted as a negative effect of subsidies: Since so far there have not been 
clear economic criteria with respect to the distribution of subsidies to hospi-
tals, subsidies need not increase efficiency. Possibly some subsidies were 
targeted at hospitals whose management had good political relations. Fur-
thermore, we do not find regional income levels to be significantly related to 
the PD. Finally, East German hospitals have lower PDs than those in West 
Germany. The modernization of East German hospitals after German unifi-
cation seems to have put them into a good financial shape.  16    B. Augurzky, D. Engel, C. M. Schmidt und C. Schwierz
 
  
Once variation within hospitals is captured by the fixed-effects estimator, 
few coefficients remain significant (column 2). The coefficient estimate on 
market power changes its sign, the coefficient estimate on the regional in-
come level becomes significantly negative. Overall, differences in the cur-
rent level of the PD within hospitals can hardly be accounted for by our 
observable attributes and by attributes of the market. This may be due to 
the fact that changes in the explanatory variables are of little magnitude 
during the short time frame of observation. For instance, 47% of all hospi-
tals experienced no change in the number of beds and a further 33% of hos-
pitals displayed changes that were lower than 10%.  
Not only does variation between hospitals explain more of the variation in 
the PDs than variation within hospitals. Unobservable fixed-effects signifi-
cantly contribute to the level of the PD as well, and therefore “explain” 
permanent differences in the PD across ownership-types. The fixed-effects 
from our regression results reveal that the mean fixed-effect is -0.017 for 
private for-profits, -1.625 for private nonprofits and 1.401 for public hospi-
tals. The hypothesis that the mean fixed-effect from each of the private hos-
pital types is not lower than the mean fixed-effect from public hospitals is 
rejected with a one-sided t-test on the 1 percent significance level. Thus, 
unobservable fixed-differences between ownership-types seem to drive 
permanent differences in the PD across ownership-types. 
4.2 Dynamic  model 
Our analysis of state dependency in the PD is based on equation (2). Before 
reporting the results of the dynamic specification we report a simple OLS 
and fixed-effects estimation including the lagged PD as a covariate. The 
OLS estimates for the coefficient on the lagged PD are known to be biased 
upwards, whereas the results of the panel fixed-effects model are known to 
be biased downwards. The point estimates of the upper and lower bounds of 
the true coefficient are 0.765 (t-value: 31.65) and 0.134 (t-value: 2.11). The 
estimated coefficients serve as bounds, irrespective of specification (Bond 
2002). Ownership and Financial Performance in the German Hospital Sector  17 
Table 5  
The probability of default – dynamic model 
 




3 (1) (2) 
Probability of defaultt-1  0.566*** 0.580*** 0.564*** 0.581*** 
  (0.091) (0.134) (0.067) (0.063) 
Probability of defaultt-1* 
Private for-profit 
- -0.088 - -0.081 
  - (0.286) - (0.073) 
Probability of defaultt-1* 
Private nonprofit 
- -0.086 - -0.172 
  - (0.217) - (0.116) 
Private for-profit  -0.259  -0.197  -  - 
 (0.509)  (0.676)  -  - 
Private nonprofit  -0.194  -0.418  -  - 
 (0.514)  (0.556)  -  - 
Other hospital and regional variables
4  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  614 614 614 614 
Number  of  hospitals  283 283 283 283 
AR(1)
 5 -3.52***  -3.40***  -  - 
AR(2) -0.40  -0.39  -  - 
Sargan Statistic  0.570  0.490  -  - 
Diff.-Sargan test (System vs. first-diff. 
GMM) 
0.501(29) 0.141(32) - - 
F-test (whole model)  6.77***  5.80***  -  - 
Notes: 
1  Bias-corrected least squares dummy variables estimator; 
2  Without interactions be-
tween the PD and ownership types;
3 With interactions between the PD and ownership types; 
In columns 1-2 two-step GMM estimates with corrected standard errors are used (Windmeijer 
2005); Variables treated as predetermined are:  beds, beds squared, relative cost level, public 
subsidies; 
4 Variables omitted from presentation are beds, beds squared, market concentration, 
relative cost level, regional level capacity, public subsidy, East Germany, regional income 
level; 
5AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first- and second- order serial correlation in the first-
differenced residuals (Arellano, Bond 1991); Sargan statistics are χ ² distributed and not 
available in robust estimation as in column (1); Standard errors in parentheses; ***Indicates 
significance at 1% level; **at 5% level; *at 10% level. For easy reading, p-values for Sargan-
test are reported only. 
In Table 5 we first present estimates based on system GMM (columns 1 and 
2). The Sargan tests are favorable to treating all hospital-specific variables 
as predetermined and the regional market variables as exogenous. We omit 
from the table the results of other explanatory variables than ownership 
form and lagged PD, as they were mostly insignificant, which could be ex-
pected from the results of the fixed-effects specification of the static model.
 10 
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In all specifications we reject the null hypothesis of no first-order correlation 
and do not reject the hypothesis of second-order autocorrelation. This im-
plies that estimates are consistent (Arellano and Bond 1991). In all specifi-
cations the statistic of the Sargan Test is insignificant on conventional sig-
nificance levels (p-value of at least 0.25 as suggested by Roodman (2007)) 
indicating that our over-identifying restrictions are valid. In comparison to 
first-differenced GMM the Hansen statistic does not deteriorate strongly 
when using the system GMM estimator. As a matter of fact, the additional 
moment conditions in the system GMM are not rejected to be valid at the 
10%-level (p-values of 0.501 and 0.141, respectively). 
Within the system GMM models, the final sample size reduces to 614 obser-
vations. Due to the small sample size no further lags are included in the 
regression. The estimated coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is 
highly statistically significant. According to the estimate around 57 to 58 
percent of a PD in t – 1 is translated into the next period’s PD. This value is 
far from zero, but also far from one, indicating a significant amount of tran-
sitions in the individual PDs over time. The negative coefficients of interac-
tions between the lagged PD and ownership types are not significantly dif-
ferent from zero suggesting that ownership-specific path dependence in the 
PD is not relevant. There is hardly any difference in the described effects 
when using the LSDVC estimator (columns 3 and 4), thereby providing 
support for the validity of the estimation results. 
It may well be, however, that hospitals are more heterogeneous than al-
lowed for in the estimation strategy so far. To account for more heterogene-
ity in behavior, we split the sample by ownership types and estimate model 2 
via LSDVC (Table 6). We now see that persistence in the PD differs across 
ownership types. Public hospitals have the highest persistence, closely fol-
lowed by private for-profits and a relatively low persistence for private non-
profits (columns (1) in Table 6). The main contribution of Table 6 is to allow 
the persistence in the PD to differ by starting categories – “green”, “yellow” 
and “red” – of the PD. The results reveal that public hospitals in the “green” 
category change their PD significantly faster than hospitals in the initial 
category “red”. Thus, it seems that public hospitals with high PDs are – if at 
all – very slow to reduce their PDs. Contrary to that, we do not see any dif-
ference in performance due to starting levels of the PD for private hospitals.  Ownership and Financial Performance in the German Hospital Sector  19 
Table 6   









 1  (2)
 2  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2) 
Probability of defaultt-1  0.669***  0.746***  0.231**  0.174  0.560***  0.616*** 
  (0.093)  (0.086)  (0.106)  (0.114)  (0.156)  (0.165) 
Probability of defaultt-1* 
“Green”-Probability of 
default in t=0 
-  -0.431**  -  0.036  -  -0.548 
  -  (0.169)  -  (0.240)  -  (0.823) 
Probability of defaultt-1* 
“Yellow”-Probability of 
default in t=0 
-  -0.284  -  0.088  -  -0.260 
   -  (0.307)  -  (0.216)  -  (0.205) 
Other hospital and 
regional variables
3 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations    278    223    113 
Hospitals    (119)    (111)    (53) 
Notes: 
1 Without interactions between the PD and starting category of the PD;
2 With interactions 
between the PD and starting category of the PD;
3 Variables omitted from presentation are beds, beds 
squared, market concentration, relative cost level, regional level capacity, public subsidy, East Ger-
many, regional income level; Estimates based on LSDVC: In all regressions we use the Blundell and 
Bond type of GMM estimation for bias-correction of the LSDV, 100 repetitions for the bootstrap 
variance-covariance matrix and bias approximation of order N
-1T
-2; ***Indicates significance at 1% 
level; **at 5% level; *at 10% level. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has considered the dynamics of the financial performance of 
acute care hospitals focusing on the role of ownership. It has used the yearly 
probability of default (PD) to measure financial performance. Previous 
analyses of financial performance have used more simple econometric tech-
niques and have not investigated the dynamics of financial performance 
over time. Our models allow for state dependence in financial performance 
as well as unobserved individual heterogeneity.  
Our results demonstrate that public hospitals tend to exhibit a PD that is 
significantly above average. This association indicates that public ownership 
may be conflicting with financial soundness, but it does not prove this rela-
tionship to be causal. When we analyze the longitudinal characteristics of 
our sample, we find that unobservable fixed-differences account for much of 
the permanent differences in the PD across ownership-types. More specifi-
cally, these persistent differences increase the PD of public versus private 20    B. Augurzky, D. Engel, C. M. Schmidt und C. Schwierz
 
  
hospitals. In contrast, private ownership, both of nonprofit and for-profit 
orientation, score equally well in terms of financial robustness.  
The panel analyses further point out that PD is characterized by a signifi-
cantly positive state dependence. On average around 60% of the pre-period 
PD is carried over to the next period. This value, however, is also far from 
100% indicating a large amount of transitions, i.e. improvements and dete-
riorations, in financial performance over time. In particular, hospitals dis-
playing a low financial performance in one period might be able to recover 
over time. 
Yet, our findings suggest that hospitals are quite heterogeneous with respect 
to path dependence in the PD. First, public hospitals display the highest 
persistence, closely followed by private for-profits. By contrast, we find a 
relatively low persistence for private nonprofits. Second, public hospitals 
which start with a poor financial standing remain in that state or even dete-
riorate over time relative to public hospitals with a favorable starting posi-
tion. Thus, it seems that public hospitals with high PDs are – if at all – very 
slow to reduce their PDs. Contrary to that, we do not see any difference in 
performance due to starting levels of the PD for private hospitals. In a mar-
ket which is characterized by over-capacities, these results provide a clear 
recommendation for economic policy: Closing down the worst low-
performers appears to be a more promising strategy than the decision to 
restructure all low-performers. 
In this study, only a short panel of data was available. Future research that is 
based on more observations per unit may give further insights in the long-
term ability of hospitals to change their financial soundness. With a longer 
panel it would also be possible to see more clearly whether hospitals are 
able to improve their financial standing by changes in the hospitals’ charac-
teristics. Furthermore, it would be interesting to examine how conversions 
in ownership-type affect the PD.  
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Appendix 
Modelling the probability of default 
Its limited sample size precludes the direct estimation of PDs from our hos-
pital data base. Instead, we apply the logit score of Engelmann et al. (2003) 
to predict the PD associated with each hospital. The formula is as follows:  
Logit score =  
5.65 – 0.98 ¯ liabilities/assets – 1.37 ¯ bank debt/assets +  
2.42 ¯ cash/current liabilities + 2.08 ¯ cashflow/(liabilities-advances) –  
0.81 ¯ current assets/net sales – 1.49 ¯ current liabilities/assets –  
5.26 ¯ accounts payable/net assets + 0.19 ¯ net sales/assets +  
0.28 ¯ (net sales – material cost)/personnel costs +  
8.21 ¯ ordinary business income/assets – 0.17 ¯ net sales one year ago. 
This rating tool has been developed for German medium-sized companies 
on the basis of 325,000 balance sheets spanning the years 1987 to 1999. Ownership and Financial Performance in the German Hospital Sector  23 
About 3,000 of the units were identified as legal insolvencies. The quality of 
a rating system mainly depends on the fit to predict default accurately. En-
gelmann et al. (2003) show that their logit score outperforms the Altman’s 
Z-score (Altman 1968), the conventional benchmark model in the financial 
literature to predict a default. 
We further checked the efficiency of the model against Moody’s KMV 
RiskCalc
TM, a leading credit rating model for corporations. In the first step, 
we create a broad sample of medium-sized firms with full information in 
those accounting data which are needed to produce both rating scores. 
About 15,972 balance sheet data, mainly from the years 2002 and 2003 are 
considered to test for the accuracy, with 81 firms identified as legal insolven-
cies. In the second step, we apply the concept of a receiver operating charac-
teristic (ROC) curve  to prepare the test on differences between two rating 
models. The ROC-curve is a binary classification model that is frequently 
used to compare the efficiency of rating models (Engelmann et al. 2003). 
The chi(2) test on differences of the areas below the ROC curves shows a p-
value of 0.1232 and thus, the null hypothesis of similar areas below the ROC 
curves is not be rejected at the significance level of 1%. 
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Variable Definitions and descriptive statistics  
Table A1   
Variable Definitions and descriptive statistics 
Variable Definition  Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Hospital level      
Probability of default (PD)  Predicted one-year probability of 
default, based on logit scores.  1.29 2.28 
Private nonprofit  1, if private not-for profit hospital, 0 
otherwise  0.38 0.48 
Private for-profit  1, if private for profit hospital, 0 
otherwise  0.19 0.39 
Public   1, if publicly owned hospital, 0 
otherwise  0.43 0.50 
Market power
1 Herfindahl-Hirschman-Index  2412.14  1653.16 
Beds  Number of beds  369.34  253.86 
Relative cost level
2  Hospital base rate  -0.05  0.11 
Regional level      
Regional capacity utilization
3  Yearly hospital capacity utilization   0.78  0.04 
Public subsidies
4   1.01  0.24 
East Germany  1, if hospital is situated in East 
Germany, 0 otherwise  0.26 0.44 
Regional income level 
County’s yearly average real income 
level per capita relative to the Ger-
man average 
1.03 0.30 
1This index is defined as the sum of the squared market shares of all hospitals in 
hospital’s i market within each of the 16 available fields of medicine (ophthalmology, 
surgery etc.), respectively. For each hospital, the 16 specific HHIs are averaged to 
get a hospital-wide HHI. The hospital’s local market is defined as the sum of beds in 
maximum distance of 50 kilometres. Higher values of HHI correspond to higher 
levels of market power. – 
2Under the old reimbursement scheme the hospital’s reim-
bursement for direct services for patients was based on base rates, which are sup-
posed to reflect the hospitals’ individual average cost levels. Thus, hospitals provid-
ing the same care received different levels of reimbursement. We divide the hospit-
al’s individual base rates by the average base rate of a German Federal State to 
arrive at a measure of relative cost levels. – 
3Measured at the level of the German 
Federal States and differing by ownership type specific hospital. – 
4The sum of all 
public funds directed to basic reinvestment per bed in a Federal State related to the 
average value for East German as well as West German Federal States. 
 
Analysis of the probability of an entry or a drop-out depending on the PD 
In our estimations, we use the observations of all hospitals that are in the 
sample for more than just a single wave. To gauge the relevance of selective 
drop-outs, we relate the hospital characteristics in the previous period to the 
incidence of a drop out in an auxiliary analysis. The dependent variable is 
coded as 1 if the hospital dropped out from the sample and 0 otherwise. We 
also conduct a similar analysis for new entries into the sample, using the 
contemporaneous characteristics as explanatory factors. Thus, the depen-Ownership and Financial Performance in the German Hospital Sector  25 
dent variable is coded as 1 if the hospital dropped into the sample and 0 for 
those who were already in wave t. The probability of entries is modeled 
separately for each wave starting in 2002. In all regressions we model inte-
ractions between the PD and the ownership-form to see if the association of 
the PD with the probability of an entry or a drop-out varies between owner-
ship forms.  
Table A2 shows the partial effects of the regressors on the probability of an 
entry or drop-out along with the significance levels. Concerning observable 
sample selection on the PD, there is no statistically significant relation be-
tween the probability of a drop-out and the PD. As a minor exception, the 
results indicate a statistically significant and negative association between 
the PD and the probability of an entry in the year 2004. Private nonprofit 
hospitals have a higher probability to drop-out or to enter in 2003 and 2005. 
There are no non-linearities between ownership status and the PD, as the 
interaction effects are statistically not significant. The year effects (not 
shown in the table) have a strong and decreasing negative effect on the 
probability of an entry. Other statistically significant effects have very low 
magnitudes. 
 
Table A2   




  2002 2003 2004 2005 
Log(PD) -0.008  -0.037 0.014  -0.040**  0.002 
Log(PD) *  private nonprofit 0.010  0.029 -0.027 0.020 -0.011 
Log(PD) * private for-profit 0.001  0.031 -0.050 0.035 0.001 
Private  nonprofit  0.209*** 0.057 0.181** 0.032 0.0021* 
Private for-profit  0.040  -0.013  -0.135  0.001  -0.004 
Beds -0.001**  -0.001*** -0.001  -0.001  0.001*** 
Beds*beds 0.001  0.001***  0.001  0.001  0.001** 
HHI 0.001***  0.001***  0.001*** 0.003***  -0.004* 
Relative cost level  0.104  -0.583  0.103  -0.239  -0.002** 
Public subsidies  0.003**  -0.001 -0.014  -0.001***  0.004** 
Regional income  0.001  -0.001  -0.002  0.007  -0.011 
East Germany  -0.026  -0.068  0.022  0.019  0.019 
Observations  631 169 232 269 157 
Log likelihood  -315.3  -98.3 -121.9  -113.1 -75.9 
Notes: Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10; Huber-White robust 
standard errors given. 
 